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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
ABBREVIATIONS
DFU  Defined hazard and accident situations 
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
NCS Norwegian Continental Shelf  
NPD The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
NORSCI Norwegian Offshore Risk and Safety Climate Inventory
PSA The Petroleum Safety Authority
UK United Kingdom
RNNS The project ”Trends in risk level” 
[Utvikling i RisikoNivå - Norsk Sokkel] 
DEFINITIONS
Injury An injury is a bodily injury caused by an accident. The injury must be 
caused by a sudden, external stress or load that is greater than can be 
expected in the ordinary performance of work. Recordable injuries in 
this study include fatalities and lost-time injuries involving substitute 
work and health care 
Lagging indicator Performance measures that represent the consequences of actions 
previously taken
Leading indicator A measure to provide early feedback on performance
Serious incidents All undesirable incidents that have or could have caused (conditions and 
near misses) injury, damage or loss categorized as having a degree of 
seriousness of level 1 or 2 on a 5 level scale  where 1 is most serious 
Sickness absence Days of absence from work with a medical certificate from a doctor or 
an absence reported by the employee (self-reporting) 
Undesirable
incidents
All undesirable incidents that have or could have caused (conditions and 
near misses) injury, damage or loss categorized as having a degree of  
seriousness of levels 1–5 on a five-level scale 
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SUMMARY
This thesis is based on four studies of aspects of health, safety and environment (HSE) 
culture in the petroleum industry in Norway. 
Oil and gas production is currently Norway’s largest industry, with both offshore and 
onshore operations. HSE issues, focusing on reducing risks to people, facilities and the 
environment, are important in this industry. The main objective of this study was to 
gain more knowledge about factors that affect the HSE in the Norwegian petroleum 
industry and to discuss how these factors might be part of the concept “HSE culture”. 
It has been of special interest to gain more knowledge of organisational and working 
environment factors that affect health and safety in the petroleum industry.  
Aims of the studies
The aim of study I, was to gain more knowledge of the various ways the health, safety 
and environment culture concept was understood and defined among employees with 
and without leadership responsibility.
The aims of study II, was to investigate the possible associations between working 
conditions and the registered health and safety results.
The aim of study III, was to compare working environment among onshore and 
offshore employees.  
The aim of study IV, was to analyse whether company belonging or local working 
environment is the most important factor for safety climate in the offshore petroleum 
industry.
Material and methods 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods has been chosen and the data 
have been gathered from several sources. In paper I we analysed interviews from 31 
workers in one petroleum company using individual semi-structured interviews in 
order to explore work-related issues which could explain aspects of HSE culture. The 
same company’s annual surveys of self-reported working environment were analysed 
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in Paper II and III. In Paper II a longitudinal design of both self-reported data and data 
from a company register were used, including items on working onshore or offshore, 
department, age, gender, perception of nearest manager, confidence in management, 
HSE behaviour, competence, collaboration and procedures. We also analysed health 
and safety performance; sickness absence, recordable injuries, serious incidents and 
undesirable incidents. Paper III was a longitudinal study design from 2003 to 2005 
performed with data from employees from offshore and onshore plants. We included 
the same items from the self-reporting working environment survey as in paper II. 
Paper IV was a cross-sectional study including 4479 employees in 2005. The data 
came from the Petroleum Safety Authorities project “Trends in Risk Levels”. The five 
largest companies on the Norwegian continental shelf were analysed, using factors 
relevant for safety and working environment.   
In this thesis we have studied six factors that might be a part of HSE culture: 
Management, behaviour, competence, collaboration, procedures and the physical 
environment. Paper I includes all the factors. The other studies are partly based upon 
the first study, looking at some of these factors in more detail or from another angle.  
Results
In study I, we found that the “HSE culture” concept was used in three ways. The most 
common was descriptive, but also a causal way and a systematic way were applied. 
Managers and employees differed little in the use of the concept. Management, 
behaviour, competence, collaboration, procedures and the physical environment were 
found to be important for the HSE culture and the relationship between them was 
illustrated as an HSE culture umbrella.
In study II, we found that cconfidence in management was negatively associated with 
recordable injuries. Offshore workers reported lower scores for working condition 
factors than onshore workers.
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In study III we found that onshore petroleum workers were generally more satisfied 
with all organisational and working environment factors than offshore employees, 
especially on items concerning management and procedures. 
In study IV we found that the installation (local working environment) explained more 
than company belonging within the safety climate dimensions ”Safety prioritisation”, 
”Safety versus production”, “Individual motivation”, ”System comprehension” and 
”Competence”. Contractor employees answered more positively on the health and 
safety dimensions than operator employees did. 
Conclusions
This study has shown that “HSE culture” is a concept with several meanings, and 
management, behaviour, competence, procedures, collaboration and physical 
conditions are factors of importance. Company working and organisational survey 
might be used as indicators of risk of injuries. Management style and trust in the 
manager are important factors for personal injuries.  
Onshore workers were more satisfied with all organisational and working environment 
factors. Differences in management style and resources, type of shift work and living 
conditions might be important in explaining the differences. Local HSE work on the 
offshore installations and the HSE work by the company have importance for the HSE 
culture in the petroleum industry.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The title of this thesis may seem very broad, and I have not studied all aspects of 
“Health, safety and environment (HSE) culture”. The topic that has been of special 
interest to me is gaining more knowledge of organisational and working environment 
factors that affect health and safety in the petroleum industry, in relation to the concept 
“HSE culture”. This chapter presents the background of the study, including an 
overview of the Petroleum industry in Norway and a literature review of the research 
field of HSE culture. 
1.1 The petroleum industry in Norway 
In December 1969 a significant oil field was discovered on Norway’s Continental 
Shelf (NCS). Since then, a large-scale industry has emerged and oil and gas production 
is currently Norway’s largest industry, accounting for 24% of the country’s value 
creation (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2008). There are 52 Norwegian oil-
producing fields. The largest oil field is Ekofisk, Norway’s first oil field, where oil 
extraction started in 1971. Despite nearly 40 years of operation on the NCS, only 
around one third of the total expected resources on the NCS have been produced. The 
oil production is decreasing, but because of increasing gas production, total petroleum 
production is estimated to increase in the coming years. The exploitation of natural gas 
on the NCS started in 1977, and there has been a steady growth in production since 
then. Natural gas production makes up 41.9 per cent of the total petroleum production. 
Today there are 43 Norwegian gas producing fields (Statistic Norway, 2007). Of the 
remaining petroleum resources on the NCS almost 60 % is expected to be natural gas.
Activities in Norway’s petroleum industry include both onshore and offshore 
operations. The petroleum industry can be divided into upstream and downstream 
segments. “Upstream” here refers to exploration, extraction and production of crude 
oil and natural gas. This activity is on the NCS and is called “the Norwegian offshore 
petroleum industry”. According to Statistics Norway 2008, the upstream oil and gas 
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industry employed around 32 000 people in 2006, including 18 500 offshore 
employees in the sector “Extraction of oil and natural gas” and 13 500 employees in 
the sector “Service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction”. Both Norwegian and 
international oil companies are responsible for the actual conduct of petroleum 
activities on the NCS, also called “operation companies”. “Downstream” refers to 
refinery operations, distribution and retail of petroleum fractions.  
Figure 1 Offshore platform, production ship and onshore processing plant (Photo: StatoilHydro).                                    
1.1.1 Offshore and onshore working conditions 
The oil installations related to the petroleum operations on the Norwegian continental 
shelf are located 40 to 185 miles from the coast. The crews are transported by 
helicopter to the offshore installations and the working period is normally 14 
continuous days with 12-hour shifts, day or night, followed by a 4-week off period at 
home, the “2-4 “schedule. 
The offshore working environment may involve several occupational hazards that can 
be stressful (Parkes, 1998; Gardner, 2003; Mearns et al., 2001; Chen, 2005). 
Psychosocial stress related to working and living conditions has been described 
(Lauridsen, 1990; Rundmo, 1992; Rundmo et al., 1995; Parkes, 1999; 2003) as well as 
physical stressors in indoor environments in the living quarters at offshore installations 
(Eide et al.,. 1992a; 1992b) and job stress (Ulleberg and Rundmo, 1997; Rundmo et 
al.,. 1998). A high prevalence of work-related musculoskeletal disorders (Morken et 
al., 2007) and occupational hearing loss (Morken et al., 2005) have been described 
among some groups of workers. Possible exposure to oil mist and oil vapour during 
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offshore drilling (Eide, 1990; Steinsvåg et al., 2006; 2007) has been measured. A large 
study was conducted in 1979–1984 on the working environment, health and safety of 
workers on Mobil’s Statfjord A platform (Hellesøy, 1985). The study described and 
evaluated organisational, social and physical working environment. In the United 
Kingdom, Mearns et al. (1998; 2001; 2003) have indicated that social and 
organisational factors are associated with health and safety. One study has compared 
workers’ perception of safety and working environment factors in Norway and the 
United Kingdom (Mearns et al., 2004).  
The workers in the petroleum industry are either operator employees in an operating 
company or contractor employees employed in one of the many contractor/supplier 
firms working for an operating company. The operating companies are managing the 
day-to-day activities of the production. The contractor category contains employees 
from many different contractor companies providing services within drilling and well-
services, maintenance and catering. Operator and contractor employees are working 
side by side and collaborate both on the offshore installations and on the onshore 
plants in the different job categories.
Figure 2 Working environment in the offshore and onshore petroleum industry (Photo: StatoilHydro).                                    
In the production area several professions are needed for a large oil and gas production 
plant, such as processing operators, industrial and automatic control mechanics, 
electricians, instrument technicians, logistic personnel, painters, insulators and crane 
operators. In the drilling area we find drilling crews such as drillers, drill floor crew, 
mud engineers and well-service crew.  We also find job categories like administrative 
personnel, service workers and cooks working in the living quarters at offshore 
installations. The shift work requires manning with three crews. This entails that many 
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employees offshore have to report to more than one manager. The managers have the 
same 2–4 work schedule, but the crew alternates on different days and may not be 
replaced at the same time. In addition, most managers work day shifts only. About 
60% of the total number of offshore employees work day shift, 30% night and day 
shifts every second work period and 10% have other day and night schedules, such as 
two periods with day shifts and one period with night shifts.
The same operator company may have employees both on offshore installations and 
on onshore process plants. Administration personnel are located onshore, together with 
specialists and suppliers who support the offshore installations and the onshore process 
plants. At onshore plants employees may have similar education and tasks as the 
offshore employees. The production workers at onshore process sites normally work 
8-hour shifts, and follow a rotation schedule. The mid-level managers or nearest 
manager follow the same shift schedule as the workers. Most employees live near the 
process plant and return to their homes after work every day.  
Few studies have compared offshore and onshore workers, and the ones that have been 
carried out have been restricted to mental health (Banks et al., 1980), shift work and 
perceived working environment and health (Parkes, 1998; 2003) and shift work and 
sleep patterns (Parkes, 2002). Other working environment factors important to health 
and safety, such as the perception of the manager, competence collaboration and 
confidence, have not previously been compared onshore and offshore. 
1.1.2 High risks and high focus on HSE 
Health, safety and environment (HSE) has been an important issue since the offshore 
production and drilling operations started. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD) was established in 1972, and later (2004) divided into Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate and the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA). PSA is a regulatory 
authority for technical and operational safety as well as for working environment. Its 
task is to stipulate premises and follow-up to ensure that the participants in petroleum 
activities maintain high standards of health, environment, safety and emergency 
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preparedness. The first safety regulations were implemented in 1976. Since 2004 PSA 
has had the regulatory responsibility for both offshore and land-based plants in 
Norway.
The Working Environment Act of 1977 regulated both the physical and the 
psychosocial working environment. In 1992 a new regulation on health and safety 
management came into force in Norway: the Internal Control Regulation. This was 
further developed to become the Systematic Health, Environmental and Safety 
Activities in Enterprises (Ministry of labour and social inclusion, 1997) and a 
systematic follow-up of the working environment was implemented in the offshore 
petroleum industry regulations in 1995. 
The Norwegian Working Environment Act requires that the employer and the 
employees co-operate within collaborative structures and provide opportunities for 
both parties to meet and consult on relevant occupational health and working 
environment matters. Internal control regulations are combining a top-down and a 
bottom-up approach to the organisation of health and safety activities at workplaces 
(Karlsen and Lindoe, 2006). The internal control regime is supposed to be effectuated 
as part of the line organisation. In Norway, everyone at his/her level has a particular 
responsibility to improve and safeguard the occupational health and safety quality of 
the workplace. However, the employer has the overall responsibility and seeks support 
both from the professional staff and from the participants in the organisation, the 
safety committee, the safety representatives and the occupational health and safety 
experts of the company (Hovden et al., 2008). 
Health, safety and environment were seen as separate issues in the seventies and early 
eighties. Technological challenges and safety challenges were the main topics in this 
area for the offshore petroleum industry. The period was characterised by many 
serious occupational accidents and some catastrophes. The most serious ones were the 
Alexander L. Kielland breakdown in 1980, where 123 people got killed, and the Bravo 
blow-out in 1977 (Ryggvik and Smith-Solbakken, 1997).  
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Systematic work on health and working environment was strengthened in the offshore 
petroleum industry during the eighties and nineties. Topics of concern were, among 
others, ergonomics and human factors, chemical hazards, stress and technical working 
environment regulations. The occupational health service for the offshore population 
was developed; at the early stages securing health examinations, treatment and 
prevention.
The concepts “health, safety and environment” became more integrated during the 
nineties, as could also be discerned in the regulations from the Authorities. The 
working environment came more into focus during these years in the offshore and 
onshore petroleum industry in Norway.  
An occupational health and working environment service is important and mandatory 
in the petroleum companies. Most companies have employed professionals with 
relevant expertise within physical, chemical, ergonomic and organisational working 
environment conditions, as well as acquired knowledge concerning possible effects on 
health, safety and productivity. On Norwegian offshore installations the occupational 
health service also takes care of injured and sick personnel. 
The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision (Norwegian name: Statens helsetilsyn) is 
an independent supervision authority, with responsibility for general supervision of 
health, health care personnel and social services. They set premises for the offshore 
health service and follow up that offshore health services are run in accordance with 
acceptable professional standards. All installations are covered by a search and rescue 
service (SAR).
Offshore workers are required to pass a mandatory medical examination. Regular 
programs for monitoring health related to relevant work-related risks are offered to the 
employees. If work-related diseases and disorders, or risks of such, are suspected, the 
manager will implement actions and track these, supported by health and working 
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environment personnel. Health promotion work and preventive health and working 
environment programmes are important for many of these companies. When planning 
new workplaces high standards are set for the working environment, and evaluation of 
health risks and identifying measures to remove or reduce risks are important areas in 
new projects.
Today emission to sea and possible climate changes due to pollution of the air are 
environmental issues which are of importance for the petroleum industry. During 
drilling activities polluted rock material (drill cuttings) and drilling chemicals may be 
discharged, and during production produced water contaminated with oil and 
production chemicals might be discharged as well. A great deal of energy is needed for 
the production phase, and this may be produced using gas or diesel generators which 
emit greenhouse gases and gases that can result in the formation of ground-level ozone 
or cause acidification when they reach land. In addition, shuttle tankers and supply 
ships used to transport oil and gas and equipment also generate water and air pollution 
and may also have a negative impact on fauna, animals and birds. 
Norway intends to be a front-runner within technology, environment and climate, and 
several research programs and activities related to the petroleum industry have been 
established in order to meet the environment and climate challenges mentioned here. 
1.1.3 HSE facts in the Norwegian petroleum industry  
The Petroleum Industry in Norway aims at reducing risks to people, facilities and the 
environment. However, the HSE-work is still in need of improvement. During the past 
ten years six people have been killed in accidents in the petroleum industry (PSA 
included land-based plants in the statistics from 2004, because regulatory 
responsibility for these facilities was transferred to them).
The frequency of personal injuries went down from above 70 injured per 1000 years 
worked in 1978 to about 40 injured per 1000 years worked in 1994 at the fixed 
installations. Furthermore, reports from the petroleum industry show a decline in 
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reported personal injuries in the period 1998–2007 (Petroleum Safety Authorities, 
2008) (Figure 3).  There was a substantial reduction in the frequency of reportable 
personal injuries in the 2000–2004 period, which subsequently stabilised at this level. 
However, the reduction from 2000 to 2004 might be explained by a change at 
company level in the classification of injuries at the boundary between medical 
treatment and first aid. The latter was not included in the statistics after 2005 
(Petroleum Safety Authorities, 2008). This fact, among other things, led to some 
concern within the industry. Although safety was considered an important issue, the 
number of accidents did not decrease. This has been a focus for discussions in recent 
years.
Injury frequency is lower for operator employees than for contractor personnel in the 
petroleum industry (Petroleum Safety Authorities, 2008) and this might tell us 
something about who carries out the most dangerous jobs. Drilling and well-operations 
are performed almost exclusively by contractors. Where job categories are more 
comparable, such as administration, catering and construction/maintenance, there is 
little difference between injury frequencies for operator and contractor employees.
Figure 3 Personal injury frequencies by job category on permanent positioned installations in the petroleum 
industry (Petroleum Safety Authorities, 2008). 
During 1992–2003 47% of the reported work-related illnesses at offshore installations 
were musculoskeletal disorders (Morken et. al., 2007). Heavy loads or lifting and 
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repetitive, monotonous work are the main reported reasons for these illnesses. In the 
2005–2007 periods, we have seen an increased number of reports of work-related 
hearing loss due to noise (Figure 4) (Petroleum Safety Authorities, 2008). Many job 
categories are exposed to a higher level of noise than the limit stipulated in the HSE 
regulations, and personnel are dependent on hearing protection to prevent damage to 
hearing. However, we do not know if there is a genuine rise in the number of cases of 
hearing loss or if this is related to an increased focus on the problem. After 
musculoskeletal illness and hearing loss, skin problems constitute the largest group of 
diagnoses. A considerable number of cases involve eczema on the hands. This might 
be a consequence of contact with oil-based substances.
UAL REPORT 2007 
Figure 4 Work related diseases 2005-2007 in the petroleum industry (Petroleum Safety Authorities, 2008). 
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (2008) concludes, in the report “Trends in 
Risk level 2007”, that the indicators reflecting major accident risk show a statistically 
significant reduction over the course of the past three years, compared to the average 
for the period 2000–2006. This applies both to production and mobile facilities.
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Since 2002 there has been a significant reduction in the number of hydrocarbon leaks 
with a leak rate of more than 0.1 kilo per second (Figure 5). The number of incidents 
related to drilling and wells connected to production and exploration drilling and ships 
on a collision course also shows an improvement the last years (Petroleum Safety 
Authorities, 2008).
Figure 5 Number of hydrocarbon leaks exceeding 0.1 kg/s, 1996-2007 in the petroleum industry (Petroleum 
Safety Authorities, 2008). 
The Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) is a directorate under the Ministry 
of the Environment. The Authority reports a reduction of emissions from hazardous 
chemicals from the oil and gas industry from 1998 to 2007 (Figure 6) and an increase 
in the emissions of green house gases (Figure 7) (Norwegian Pollution Control 
Authority, 2008). 
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Figure 6 Emissions of hazardous chemicals from oil ad gas industry, 1998-2007 (Norwegian Pollution Control 
Authority, 2008). 
Figure 7 Emissions of greenhouse gases from oil ad gas industry, 1997-2007 (Norwegian Pollution Control 
Authority, 2008). 
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1.1.4 HSE culture in the petroleum regulation 
In 2001 the Government of Norway presented a white Paper on HSE on the 
Continental Shelf (Stortingsmelding no 7, 2001/2002). This report stated that the 
authorities were concerned about the safety performance, as previously mentioned. 
The concept “HSE culture” was introduced in this report and identified as a priority 
area. The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway underlined this priority in its further 
regulatory work. The Norwegian petroleum industries framework regulation for HSE 
of 1 January 2002, chapter 3, section 11, specifies that enterprises must have a sound 
health, environment and safety culture, saying: “The party responsible shall encourage 
and promote a sound health, environment and safety culture comprising all activity 
areas and which contributes to achieving that everyone who takes part in petroleum 
activities takes on responsibility in relation to health, environment and safety, 
including also systematic development and improvement of health, environment and 
safety”.
The guideline to this section states: In order to make it clear that this section applies 
across the entire scope of application of the regulations, the concept “health, 
environment and safety culture” is used instead of the more established term “safety 
culture”. However, the authorities did not define “HSE culture”. To define the content 
of the concept of “HSE culture” became a challenge for the companies, and the 
companies in the petroleum industry in Norway had different approaches on how to 
work with this concept “HSE culture”. Some companies developed huge programs for 
employees and contractors to emphasise safe behaviour in workshops, where both 
management and personnel committed themselves to safe behaviour in their work. 
Other companies developed management and employee programs underlining the 
differences between culture and structure. Structure was understood as requirements 
and procedures and culture were understood as leadership, interaction, attitude and 
behaviour. Training programmes were developed based on the different culture 
dimension.  
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Discussions were raised among the three-party cooperation – employer, unions and the 
authorities – on whether the programmes were sufficient for strengthening the HSE 
culture. The employer focused primary on the individual level in the programmes, 
whereas the employee organisations wanted to focus on the frame conditions. In 
September 2004, PSA stated in a notification a concern about actors in the petroleum 
industry focusing too much on employee’s attitude and behaviour. The Authorities 
underlined that HSE culture was about a continuous, critical and extensive work 
related to technical safety and management systems in addition to the organisational, 
psychosocial and behavioural approach.
PSA made a theme-pamphlet named “HSE and Culture” in 2004 (Petroleum Safety 
Authorities, 2004). The pamphlet provided perspectives on how to understand the 
concept and input on how the requirements for good HSE culture could be fulfilled. 
The authorities stated that the prerequisites for a good HSE culture were that health, 
safety and environmental work were not viewed separately and that there was a good 
balance between the individual's responsibility in the HSE work and the company's 
responsibility for facilitating good working conditions. The pamphlet was meant to be 
a tool for the industry in its work on improving the HSE culture, and emphasised a 
stronger focus on the "H" and "E" in addition to continued work to improve the HSE.
To secure good cooperation between the three-party cooperation in the Norwegian 
petroleum industry, the “Safety Forum” was established in 2001 to initiate, discuss and 
follow up relevant safety, emergency preparedness and working environment issues in 
the petroleum industry, both offshore and at onshore facilities, in a tripartite 
perspective. “The Safety Forum” is the central arena for cooperation among the parties 
in the industry and the authorities as regards health, safety and environment in the 
petroleum activities on the Norwegian continental shelf and onshore. Examples of key 
projects and processes followed up by this Forum are chemical health risk, groups at 
risk and the Risk Level Project.
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The Risk Level Project was initiated in 1999/2000 to develop and utilise a measuring 
tool which illustrates the development of the risk level on the Norwegian shelf. The 
project is important to the industry by contributing to a universal understanding of risk 
level development among the parties. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are 
used. The project describes indicators, so-called defined hazard and accident situations 
(DFUs), which are critical to safety and the working environment. It also includes 
questionnaire surveys, interviews, field work and other studies to form the basis for 
social science analyses. The project focuses on major accidents, work accidents and 
selected working environment factors such as noise and chemical exposure.  
1.2 Health, safety and environment culture –theoretical framework 
The root of the word culture arises from the Latin world “colore”, which means to 
cultivate. “Culture” is a commonly used word and can signify art, theatre, film, sport 
etc. We often use the word with a prefix such as “national culture”, “sub-culture”, 
“organisational culture” and now also “HSE culture”. In 1952 Kluchhohns and 
Kroeber (Kluckhohns and Kroeber, 1952) tried to classify the culture concept. They 
discussed 162 different definitions of culture. The concept is still debated in the 
literature and there are different definitions, traditions and understandings; e.g. 
anthropologists have a different understanding of culture from that of many 
management and organization theorists (Haukelid, 2008). This has implications on the 
discussion of culture; if and how culture can be measured and if there might be a 
common culture within an organization.  
Edgard Schein’s definition (1985, page 12) of organisational culture is often used;
"A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough 
to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way 
you perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” .
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In this definition culture is perceived as the shared understandings in a given 
organization, also called the integration perspective. 
Alvesson (2002, page 3) define culture as:
“The shared rules governing cognitive and affective aspects of membership in an 
organisation and the means whereby they are shaped and expressed”
Alvesson’s understanding of culture is that cultures do not necessarily establish clarity, 
shared orientations and consensus among broad groups of people, but still offer 
guidelines for coping with instances of ambiguity without too much anarchy or 
confusion (Alvesson, 2002). 
The concept “safety culture” has been discussed in the international literature since 
1986, e.g. in the report on the Chernobyl nuclear accident from the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (INSAG, 1988). Cox and Flin (1998) and Guldenmund (2000) 
reviewed the literature on safety culture and showed that “safety culture” developed as 
a concept because it was difficult to explain a linear connection between one causal 
factor and various big accidents in the industry in the early eighties (Cooper, 2000). 
Lack of a positive safety culture was used as a concept in explaining these accidents 
and catastrophes. It was proposed that the main reasons for the disasters and potential 
future accidents did not only include technical faults or individual human errors 
committed by the frontline workers. The management, organisation and attitudes of 
the personnel were also noted to influence safety. The theoretical framework on safety 
culture started to be developed in the nuclear industry (Lee and Harrison, 2000; 
Cooper, 2000) and later in other industries like aviation (McDonald et al., 2000), the 
transport sector, including railways (Clarke, 1999;  Farrington-Darby et al., 2005), 
healthcare sector (Singer et al., 2003), chemical industry (Donald and Canter, 1994), 
manufacturing (Cheyne et al., 1998) and in the offshore industry (Mearns et al., 1998; 
2001; 2003; Høivik et al., 2008).  In the Norwegian petroleum industry “safety 
culture” was first used in the late 1980s in relation to drilling operations (Haukelid et 
al., 1991; Haukelid, 1998).
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Even though “safety culture” has been a popular concept for explaining accidents, the 
theoretical fundament has been criticised as ill-defined. There has been no consensus 
on the content of a safety culture or the consequences, and there are no satisfactory 
models of safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000). A definition of “safety culture” is 
proposed by the advisory committee on the safety of nuclear installation (ACSNI, 
1993, page 23): They define “safety culture” as
“the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and 
the style and proficiency of an organization’s health and safety management”. 
Richter and Koch’s definition of safety culture (2004, page 705) underlines the 
connection between organisation, work and safety: 
We define safety culture as the shared and learned meanings, experiences and 
interpretations of work and safety – expressed partially symbolically – which 
guide peoples‘ actions towards risks, accidents and prevention. Safety culture is 
shaped by people in the structures and social relations within and outside the 
organization.
Within this tradition culture consists of shared elements, e.g. attitudes, values, 
assumptions and norms, held amongst the members of a group, and are transferred 
between groups of people. Glendon (2000) discuss three levels of culture used in the 
literature: the most accessible and visible, behaviour and artefacts; the intermediate 
level: values, norms and strategic beliefs; and the deepest level: underlying 
assumptions, invisible, preconscious and taken for granted. 
The concept of “safety culture” and the concept of “HSE culture” seem to be related to 
the concept of “organisational culture”, insofar as HSE are elements of an 
organisation’s culture. Haukelid (2008) stresses that safety culture should not be 
something separate from – or in addition to – an organisational culture, but constitute 
an integrated part of this culture. Following Richter and Koch (2004), he views safety 
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culture as a focused aspect of the organisational culture and the organisation’s culture 
cannot be considered to be a closed system. It is not only local conditions within the 
organisation that determine the culture of its members. The culture will be influenced 
partly by external (national, regional) conditions and the (educational, social-
economic, religious) background of its workforce (Guldenmund, 2007).
1.2.1 Culture and climate
“Safety culture” and “safety climate” have often been used interchangeably, although 
“climate” has been described as reflecting attitudes, perceptions and beliefs, while 
“culture” is more complex, reflecting values and norms (Mearns and Flin, 1999). 
Safety climate may be seen as a "snapshot" of the safety culture, and reflects the 
perception of an organisation shared by those participating. It is also more superficial 
and transient than culture (Flin et al., 2000).
Neal et al. (2000) argued that employees' perceptions of the policies, procedures, and 
practices relating to safety comprise the safety climate; however, others have offered 
more wide-ranging definitions, in which safety climate is viewed as a current-state 
reflection of the underlying safety culture (e.g., Mearns et al., 2001; 2003), and so 
encompasses a broader range of elements, including attitudes toward safety.
1.2.2 Health and working environment and the HSE culture concept 
The expansion of the “safety culture” concept to include health, working environment 
and environment introduced factors other than the major accidents and catastrophes 
that were originally the background for the safety culture concept. Occupational health 
and working environment are closely related to the workers’ everyday work situation 
and include individual health, well-being and psychosocial working environment as 
well as ergonomics and human factors, chemical working environment, noise, and the 
physical work conditions. The part of  HSE work related to environment concerns; 
preserving biological diversity and keeping emissions and discharges low, has until 
2002 not been a part of the international “safety culture” concept. The word “culture” 
has not been commonly used in connection with occupational health and working 
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environment or environment in the literature. Only safety has been associated with 
culture, when discussing the underlying causes of major accidents. Norway was 
among the first to introduce the HSE culture concept in the regulations.
There seems to be a relationship between health and leadership in organisations. 
Organisational health research during the past decade has shown that organisation is a 
strong factor influencing the well-being of employees (Cotton and Hart, 2003). 
Mearns et al.(2003) found a relationship between good health and safety management 
and accident statistics. Mearns and Hope (2005) investigated this relationship further 
and found that the perception of an organisation’s commitment to health was 
significantly related to safety outcomes. Occupational health issues have been 
important in workplaces in affluent countries for many years and have been seen as 
critical for improving the health and safety of employees. It is generally agreed that the 
working environment needs to be systematically improved in order to avoid accidents 
and work-related diseases (Frick et al., 2000). Occupational health practice services 
have traditionally been focused on prevention of occupational diseases and control of 
adverse effects on the health and safety of workers. The focus has been on avoiding 
sickness, accidents and illness. However, WHO (1995) stated that psychological and 
social well-being also ought to be an important area of focus for occupational health 
practices, and that new principles should go beyond the mere prevention and control of 
adverse effects to the positive promotion of health, the improvement of the work 
environment and the work organisation.  
Preventing occupational diseases and controlling adverse effects on the health of 
workers are important aspects of HSE work in socially responsible companies. The 
incidence of work-related diseases and work-related sickness absence can be 
indicators of the quality of the working environment and be seen as a part of the 
company’s HSE culture. Sickness absence is caused by a variety of factors, including 
factors related to the physical working environment (Allebeck and Mastekaasa, 2004) 
and to organisational factors such as management style, work pressure and work 
overload (Michie and Williams, 2003; Nielsen et al., 2006). Work-related diseases are 
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usually developed over a period of time and diagnosed outside the companies. 
Occupational accidents are acute and immediately visible at the work place and are 
accordingly perceived as more dramatic than occupational diseases. This difference 
between injuries and diseases could be one reason for the focus on safety culture and 
climate as precursors to prevent accidents and injuries.
1.2.3 Assessing HSE culture and climate 
Culture is complex and has to be analysed in different ways to be fully understood, 
different methods must be used to get insight to the levels of culture.  
The petroleum industry in Norway has many health and safety performance measures 
such as number of fatal accidents, lost-time injuries, serious incidents, undesired 
incidents, sickness absence, accidental oil spills, work related diseases, breach of 
security and hazardous waste recovery. These measures are all “lagging” indicators 
(performance measures that represent the consequences of actions previously taken)
and may be correlated with HSE studies or be a part of a HSE culture analysis.  
“Leading indicators” (a measure to provide early feedback on performance) may be 
used to analyse the HSE culture in an organisation by analysing policies and strategies, 
goals and plans, health and safety competence, visibility of managers, reporting 
practice, experience transfer to learn from best practice or from accidents through the 
organisation, motivation, job satisfaction etc.  
Safety culture researchers often focus on the values and assumptions of the 
organisational members with respect to safety, and emphasise the role of 
organisational norms and socialisation influences on safety behaviour and safety 
outcomes. They usually use many sources and qualitative methodologies such as field 
work, observations, written descriptions and interviews. Climate surveys might be one 
of the methods one might use in order to gain deeper knowledge about the culture.
Safety climate is usually explored through questionnaires, often composed of thematic 
questions relevant to safety. Many different scales have been developed (Flin et al., 
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2000; Guldenmund, 2000; 2007) to show the employees’ subjective opinions of an 
organisation’s safety culture. However, Guldenmund (2007) argued that safety climate 
research has basically been attitude research. 
Different approaches are probably needed in order to get insight to the HSE culture in 
an organisation just as for studies of safety culture. HSE climate surveys provide 
information about subjective opinions on HSE conditions and HSE management. 
However, a climate approach will not provide a sufficient picture of the culture related 
to HSE in the company. Observation of work practice, written documents, manager 
style and communication and interviews will give a deeper insight into the common 
culture that affects the practice in the company.   
Reviews of safety climate literature (Guldenmund, 2000; Flin et al., 2000) have 
identified numbers of measures used in a safety climate surveys. Flin et al. (2000) 
identified themes important for safety climate in 19 studies in nuclear industry, oil and 
gas industry, chemical sites, factories, manufacturing plants, aircraft, transport and 
construction. These themes included management, safety system, risk, work pressure, 
competence and procedures/rules. The factor ‘management’ emerged in 72% of the 
studies as important (Flin et al., 2000).  
Guldenmund (2007) divided the items within safety climate research into 
organisational level (the processes taking place at higher organisational levels, e.g. 
manager teams deciding policies, strategies, goals), group level (processes within 
groups or teams the respondent works in) and individual level (the particulate process 
that involve the respondent, or the attitude level). Although a large amount of research 
has focused on which safety measures should be included in the make-up of a 
questionnaire, there is still confusion over the number and type of safety climate 
measures that should be included. There are, however, a number of safety climate 
measures that are commonly used, for example management commitment, supervisor 
competence, priority of safety over production, and time pressure (Flin et al., 2000). 
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2 AIMS OF THE THESIS 
The main objective of this study was to gain more knowledge about factors that affect 
the health, safety and environment in the Norwegian petroleum industry and to discuss 
how these factors might be part of the concept “HSE culture”. It has been of special 
interest to gain more knowledge of organisational and working environment factors 
that effect health and safety in the petroleum industry. 
More specific aims:
To gain more knowledge of the various ways the health, safety and 
environment culture concept was understood and defined among 
employees with and without leadership responsibility  (Paper I) 
To investigate the possible associations between working conditions and 
the registered health and safety results (Paper II) 
To compare working environment among onshore and offshore 
employees (Paper III) 
To analyse if company belonging or local working environment is the 
most important factor for safety climate in the offshore petroleum 
industry (Paper IV) 
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3 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Several approaches would have been possible for this study. A combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods has been chosen. This increased the possibility of 
showing different aspects within the areas.
The data in this thesis are gathered from several sources, shown in Table 1. In Paper I 
we analysed interviews from 31 workers from different organisational levels in one 
petroleum company in Norway. The same company’s annual surveys of self-reported 
working conditions were analysed in Paper II and III. Data from the Petroleum Safety 
Authorities project “Trends in Risk Levels” were analysed for the five largest 
companies on the Norwegian continental shelf in Paper IV.
Table 1 Data source and number of employees offshore and onshore in four studies of HSE and culture and 
HSE climate in the Norwegian Petroleum industry. 































  897 
1079
  860 
1
Paper IV Joint industry survey  2005 4479 4479 5
*Employees from onshore and offshore departments, some are working onshore and offshore   
The study had a main focus on one petroleum company. The company studied in 
Paper I, Paper II and Paper III, had its headquarters in Norway and was the largest 
operator on the Norwegian continental shelf. It was an integrated technology-based, 
international energy company primarily focused on upstream oil and gas operations. 
The company employed approximately 32 000 employees in 40 countries. In 2008 the 
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company was an operator for 39 producing oil and gas fields and was the world's 
largest operator in waters more than 100 metres deep. The company’s onshore 
facilities in Norway were active within gas treatment, crude oil reception, refinement 
and methanol production.  The production averaged more than 1.7 million barrels of 
oil equivalent per day and it was one of the world's largest crude oil and gas suppliers. 
Paper IV has data from five petroleum companies’ operating at the NCS and the 
contractor employees working for them. 54% of the employees were employed in or 
worked for the largest company with 19 offshore installations. The second and third 
largest company employed 21% and 12% of the population, respectively, and had 10 
and 7 offshore installations, respectively. The two smallest companies, with 
respectively two and three offshore installations, staffed 8% and 5% of the total 
workers. The number of operator and contractor employees per company varied 
between 244 and 2390 employees and the number of employees in the five operating 
companies varied between 111 and 1415.  
In this thesis we have studied six factors (Table 2). Not all of the factors are studied in 
all the papers. Paper I includes all of them. The other studies are partly based upon the 
first study, looking at some of these factors in more detail or from another angle.  
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Table 2 Factors that affect workers subjective opinions of HSE culture and HSE climate, in four studies in the 
Norwegian Petroleum industry. 
Study Management Behaviour Competence Proce-dures Colla-boration
Physical
conditions
Paper I + + + + + +
Perception of 
nearest manager Paper II Confidence in 
management 
HSE
behaviour + + + -
Perception of 
nearest manager Paper III Confidence in 
management 
HSE















3.1 Paper I  
Design: In Paper I we used a qualitative research design. It was an interview study 
including 31 employees from different parts of onshore and offshore business units in 
one company, including both blue-collar and white-collar workers.
Measures: Individual semi-structured interviews were used including questions 
formed to explore work-related issues which could explain aspects of HSE culture. 
Few topics were included: HSE culture, health and working environment, safety and 
environment. 4 persons performed the interviews, two at the time.  
Analysis: Giorgi’s phenomenological analysis (1985) in four stages were used: a) 
reading the material to get a sense of the whole; b) reading the same descriptions more 
slowly to identify different meanings representing different aspects of HSE culture, 
and coding these; c) abstracting the meanings within each of the coded groups; d) 
summarising the contents of each code group to generalise descriptions reflecting the 
most important elements in the informants’ opinion of HSE culture and HSE 
challenges. The four researchers did their own coding and then discussed the code 
categories and the meaning.
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3.2 Paper II  
Design: In Paper II we used a longitudinal design of both self-reported data and data 
from a company register. 
Measures: The company in the study has performed annual surveys of self-reported 
working conditions since 1986 among both onshore and offshore workers. The
company survey was not standardised; it was developed by the company and revised 
every year. This survey had items related to the factors that emerged as important to 
understand HSE culture in the interview study in Paper I. The statements in the 
company survey are closely aligned to organisational climate questionnaires 
(Schneider and Gunnarson, 1991). The items were phrased as “I have confidence 
in …” or “In my unit we have …” and were to be answered on a six-point scale 
ranging from one (“fully disagree”) to six (“fully agree”), where six was the best score. 
In addition, “not relevant” was a response option. The self-reported surveys of 
working conditions were distributed in the electronic mail system to all employees 
once a year. A personal e-mail was sent to all employees, with a link to the electronic 
questionnaire and an assurance of anonymity. The questionnaire was sent only to the 
company’s own employees, not to the contractor staff. Data from 2003 and 2004 were 
used in this study. The response rates for the surveys were 71% in 2003 and 76% in 
2004. In this study we included items on working onshore or offshore, department, 
age, gender, perception of nearest manager, confidence in management, HSE 
behaviour, competence, collaboration and procedures. These factors were found by a 
factor analysis. 
We also analysed health and safety performance measures from the same company’s 
files: Sickness absence, recordable injuries, serious incidents and undesirable 
incidents. The petroleum company used the same reporting system for HSE data in all 
the departments in Norway. Data on recordable injuries were obtained for 2000-2004. 
The company has procedures for processing the reported data, from immediate 
notification of the incident or injury to investigation and follow-up of corrective and 
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prevention activities (Berentsen and Holmboe, 2004). Data on sickness absence were 
collected from the human resources registration tool in the company.  
Statistics: The individual data in the self-reported survey were aggregated to 
department and business unit level. Descriptive statistics were used in the form of 
percentages. Explorative principal component analysis was used to assess factorial 
structures of the items from the survey. To test the internal consistency of the indexes 
in the study, Cronbach’s alpha values were calculated. Two sample t-test was used to 
test differences between offshore and onshore workers. Pearson’s correlation analysis 
was performed to calculate the correlation between the six factors emerging from the 
factor analysis and recordable injuries, serious incidents, undesirable incidents and 
sickness absence. Linear regression analyses were carried out for each factor 
separately to study the relation between factors in the self-reported working condition 
survey and injuries summarised for 2000–2003 and 2000–2004. 
3.3 Paper III 
Design: A longitudinal study design from 2003 to 2005 was performed. The 
employees came from offshore and onshore plants.  
Measures: We analysed data from the same company survey as in Paper II. We used 
items from the annual surveys of self-reported working conditions on working onshore 
or offshore, age, gender, perception of nearest manager, confidence in management, 
HSE behaviour, competence, collaboration, and procedures. The response rates for the 
surveys were 70% in 2003, 76% in 2004 and 72% in 2005. 
Statistics: The individual data in the self-reported survey were aggregated to 
department level. Descriptive statistics were used to describe the number of 
employees, departments, age groups and gender distribution. A general linear model 
univariate test was used to test differences between offshore and onshore departments. 
An independent-samples t-test was used to test differences among offshore and 
onshore departments. Adjusted means and confidence intervals were calculated. 
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3.4 Paper IV   
Study design: This study was a cross-sectional study including 4479 employees in 
2005.
Measures: We used questionnaire data from the project ”Trends in Risk Levels – 
Norwegian Continental Shelf”, called “The Norwegian offshore risk and safety climate 
inventory” (NORSCI). The items in this survey were developed by others, but the 
survey contained relevant items on the factors that emerged as important for HSE 
culture in the company studied in Paper I–III. The questionnaire was limited to factors 
of relevance to safety and working environment. Scoring on safety climate followed 
the Likert scale from 1 to 5 expressing agreement or disagreement. Questionnaires 
including items on type of employment, age, gender, company, installation they were 
working on, safety prioritisation, safety management and involvement, safety versus 
production, individual motivation, system comprehension and competence. These 
items were partly similar to the factors studied in paper I–III. The data also included 
five companies, not only one.  
Statistics: Descriptive statistics on individual data were used to describe each company 
and the total sample concerning employment status, gender, age and number of 
installations. A factor analysis was performed for the 2005 items. Cronbach’s alpha 
was calculated to test the internal consistency of the dimensions. Pearson Chi-square 
test was applied to test the age differences between the operator and contractor 
employees. Mean scores were calculated for each item and each dimension. To test the 
differences in mean scores of the dimensions between the operator and contractor 
employees in the five companies and on the 41 installations, one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was used. Effect size was used to measure the effect of the 
relationship between the scores regardless of the sample size. ANOVA was also used 
to estimate adjusted explained variance (R2) for each dimension for operator and 
contractor employees in the five operating companies and 41 installations separately. 
Mixed model statistics were performed to study the six health and safety climate 
dimensions and the different levels of management of the workers; company and 
installation, and in addition an analysis was made through including work in an 
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operator company or a contractor company as a random factor, with age and gender as 
covariates.
3.5 Ethical issues  
The author of this thesis is the first author of all four papers and is employed by the 
company studied in Paper I–III. Also, one of the other authors in Paper II and III is 
employed by the same company. Thus, the author has conducted a special attention to 
do the research in accordance with recognised ethical standards. A researcher's 
background and position will affect what they choose to investigate, the angle of 
investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, the findings 
considered most appropriate, and the framing and communication of conclusions
(Malterud, 2001). Planning, carrying out and reporting on research have been done 
with focus upon research ethics and in close cooperation with research institutions. It 
was important to cooperate with external researchers as a strategy for being able to 
question findings and perform interpretations.
The author was manager of the company’s research program “Human factors and HSE 
culture” when the research was initiated. She became a research fellow at the 
University of Bergen in 2003 and has done the analysis in cooperation with 
researchers from different Universities in Norway and UK. In 2007 she became the 
vice president of health and working environment in the same company. This close 
relationship between the researcher and the company has of course importance, 
causing bonds of loyalty. This would have been a large problem in a study of 
evaluation of the working environment. However, the aim of the thesis was to gain 
more knowledge of organisational and working environment factors that affect health 
and safety in the petroleum industry not to evaluate these factors. Hence, to be 
employed in the company and the position of the author was of less importance. 
Permission was given from the company to publish the results of the HSE culture 
study in international journals. 
41
In the qualitative study in Paper I, we selected information rich employees form 
different places in the company. They were selected based on their positions and 
different fields of operations, gender, age and experience. The researchers came both 
from within the company and from research institutions. The interview guide and the 
interviews, the analysis and the writing were developed within this group of 
researchers to maintain adequate distance from the study setting (Malterud, 2001). In 
Paper I we used citations that underlined expressions from more than one employee; 
informants should not be recognised. This was also emphasised to the participants 
before the study started when they gave their permission to take part in the study. All 
informants were given a report with the results of the interview study. We did not ask 
about health information or sensible individual data. The interviews were taped and 
transcribed and information was given to the informants that the data will be 
maculated when the study is finished. 
In paper II and III we used data from a company-wide survey. We did not use 
individual data or health data and it was not possible to identify individuals. The 
authors used aggregated data to department and business unit levels. We did not have 
access to the individual data in these studies. In paper II we also used data on injuries, 
serious incidents and undesirable incident from the same company’s HSE database. 
This is an open database and the number of injuries and incidents were analysed at the 
same aggregated organisational level as the company-wide survey. The data on sick 
leave came from the human resource registration tool in the company, this was also 
aggregated data, and no individual health information was available.
In Paper IV approval to analyse data from NORSCI were given to the researchers at 
the University of Bergen by The Petroleum Safety Authorities Norway. Approval was 
also obtained from each of the five operating companies that were studied. It was 
emphasized that the company identities should not be revealed. To assure the 
anonymity of the five operating companies, they are identified as A, B, C, D and E in 
Table 2 and as numbers 1 to 5 in Table 3 with no link between the letters and the 
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4.1 An explorative study of health, safety and environment culture 
in a Norwegian petroleum company (Paper I) 
Research question: To gain more knowledge of the various ways the health, safety and 
environment culture concept was understood and defined among employees with and 
without leadership responsibility
The informants used the concept “HSE culture” in three ways. The most common way 
was descriptive, outlining specific characteristics of the organization as they regarded 
as relevant to HSE. The informants gave both positive and negative descriptions. 
Secondly a causal way of using the concept was used; the term was used more or less 
synonymously with concepts such as behaviour and attitudes. HSE culture was 
conceptualized as a factor with a causal effect on the HSE results of the organization. 
And a systemic way were applied for the concept were HSE culture is the holistic 
relationship between various phenomena influencing HSE in the organization. Safety 
was the topic mentioned most frequently, especially by employees at the operational 
units. However, occupational health and the working environment were also identified 
as important. Managers and employees differed little in the use of the concept of HSE 
culture and their opinions concerning the HSE challenges.
Management was described as important by all employees. Behaviour, competence, 
collaboration, procedures and the physical environment were also found to be 
important to a sound HSE culture. Putting these results together, they can be illustrated 
as an HSE culture umbrella (Figure 8). This figure illustrates the main results of the 
study; managers and employees are partners in a system of interrelationships, and they 
have different roles and actions in the HSE work. The umbrella also illustrates that 
several factors are important and necessary to express the HSE culture.
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Figure 8 An umbrella as a framework for communication about health, safety and environment culture 
developed from a study of workers in a petroleum company in Norway
4.2 Associations between self-reported working conditions and 
registered health and safety results (Paper II) 
Research question: To investigate the possible association between self-reported 
working conditions and registered health and safety results in a petroleum company in 
Norway.
Confidence in management, both in 2003 and in 2004, was significantly negatively 
associated with the mean of the sum of recordable injuries for 2000–2003 and 2000–
2004 respectively, adjusted for gender, offshore and onshore work. Recordable 
injuries were negatively correlated with all the working condition factors. This means 
that the better results the business units had on the self-reported working environment 
and organisation survey, the fewer registered accidents had occurred.
Self-reported responses regarding the perception of the nearest manager and 
confidence in management were significantly negatively correlated with sickness 
absence when analysing all offshore and onshore departments. The higher the mean 
score was on the management items, the lower the sickness absence rates. However, 
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these results were not significant when dividing the material into offshore and onshore 
work. We found significant differences between onshore and offshore departments for 
sickness absence. The sickness absence for offshore departments was 6% and for 
onshore departments 3.9% in 2003. In 2004 the sickness absence was respectively 
5.8% and 3.7%. 
Offshore workers reported lower scores for all working condition factors, and there 
were significant differences between the two groups on perception of nearest manager, 
confidence in management and procedures in both 2003 and 2004. Significant 
differences between offshore and onshore departments were found for collaboration 
and competence in 2004 only.  
4.3 Nearest management is important for health and safety (Paper 
III)
Research question: To compare working environment among onshore and offshore 
employees
Onshore workers were generally more satisfied with all organisational and working 
environment factors than offshore employees in a company survey on working 
conditions in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Perceptions of the nearest manager differed 
significantly between the offshore and onshore departments for all years and for all 
items, except for one question in 2003 and 2005. The item “Finding the information I 
require in the electronic information systems I use is easy” differed significantly 
between the groups for all three years.
Three of the four items about confidence in the management differed significantly 
between offshore and onshore responses in one or two of the years. The fourth item 
“To my friends I speak of the company as being a good company for which to work” 
differed significantly in all three years.  Three of the four items concerning HSE 
behaviour differed significantly between onshore and offshore departments both in 
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2004 and in 2005. Five items about competence differed for one or two years. The 
item “I am satisfied with my career opportunities in the company” differed 
significantly between the offshore and onshore departments in all three years.  
4.4 What is most important for safety climate; the company 
belonging or the local working environment? (Paper IV) 
Research question: To analyse whether company belonging or local working 
environment is most important for safety climate in the offshore petroleum industry
For all six healths and safety climate dimensions analysed in this study the installation 
factor explained a greater percentage of the variance than did company belonging for 
both operator and contractor employees when these were analysed separately. 
Installation (local working environment) explained more than company also when age 
and genders were included in the model. 
We found significant differences between the employees in the five operating 
companies and between the contractor employees working for these five operating 
companies within the safety climate dimensions ”Safety prioritisation”, ”Safety versus 
production”, “Individual motivation”, ”System comprehension” and ”Competence”.  
Contractor employees answered more positively on the health and safety dimensions 
than operator employees, except for the dimensions ”Safety versus production” and 
”System comprehension” in 3 and 2 operating companies respectively. The highest 
mean scores were found for the dimensions “Individual motivation” and 
“Competence”, and the lowest for “Safety versus production” and “System 
comprehension”, both for operator and for contractor employees.  
The 41 installations differed significantly in mean scores on all the health and safety 
dimensions for operator and contractor employees. The mean scores on the dimensions 
“System comprehension” and “Safety versus production” displayed the greatest 
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variations for all employees on the 41 installations, and it displayed the smallest 
variations on the dimensions “HSE behaviour” and “Competence”. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Main findings 
5.1.1 Interpretation of the HSE concept (Paper I) 
HSE is a much broader concept than safety. This has implications for the HSE work in 
the companies. The Petroleum Safety Authorities Norway expects the industry to do 
HSE planning and performance to include all HSE risks to be controlled, measured 
and improved. In the interviews in Paper I, many informants, especially from the 
production units, only addressed safety and not occupational health, working 
environment and the environment when we asked for their opinions about HSE 
culture. This might reflect what was being highlighted and communicated by the 
company earlier on.
It has been a long tradition in the petroleum industry improving engineering solutions 
and the safety management system. Mearns and Reader (2008) write that for many 
years, improving safety performance has been focused exclusively on safety matters in 
the petroleum industry as has been the case in other high risk/high-reliability 
industries. This is also seen in the scientific literature, where studies of safety climate 
and safety culture studies dominate. The international safety researchers have not 
taken the integrated HSE concept into use. With a few exceptions using the HSE 
culture and HSE climate concept (Parker et al., 2006; Hudson, 2007) safety climate 
and safety culture studies have been published focusing on safety and accidents as 
outcome only. One explanation for this may be that the safety culture concept was 
introduced as a feature in explaining the major accidents. However, The International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) made a pamphlet in 2005 called “Human 
Factors, a means of improving HSE performance”. They introduced a five-step HSE 
culture ladder, a way to improve HSE. The factors culture/working environment, 
management system, people and facilities/equipment were underlined as important, 
but most of the examples in the pamphlet were associated with or connected to 
accidents and accident investigations.
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This has also been observed by other authors. Mearns and Hope (2005) note that: 
“Interestingly, the rapidly growing literature on safety culture makes little, if any, 
reference to the concept of health or to the environment, although many organizations 
have HSE or HSEQ (health, safety, environment and quality) departments”.
Safety must be prioritised; however, a lot of employees in the petroleum industry 
suffer from hearing loss due to workplace noise (Morken et al., 2005), skin disorders 
connected to chemical substances and musculoskeletal disorders due to difficult 
working positions, heavy lifting or psychosocial factors (Morken et al., 2007). There 
has been a discussion in the industry and in the news lately if there might be a 
connection between possible chemical exposure in the petroleum industry and health 
effects. The occupational diseases, which usually occur over time, are not as visible as 
occupational accidents. This difference between injuries and diseases could be one 
reason for the focus on safety culture and climate as precursors that can be addressed 
to prevent major accidents and injuries, although the occupational health problems are 
the ones that affect most employees.
It may be of importance for the companies to know how HSE and HSE culture is used 
and understood by employees at different levels in the organisation in order to work 
systematically to improve HSE. The same approaches to HSE must permeate the 
organisation. One suggestion is that managers must go forward and lead the systematic 
HSE work in the company. Mearns and Reader (2008) discuss the problem of 
motivating safety in the UK offshore petroleum industry, as there is a lack of both 
positive and negative reinforcement regarding safety performance. They suggest more 
imaginative forms of interventions such as the supervisors being supportive towards 
the health and well-being of the workforce, based on their research results showing a 
connection between activities to improve health and safety performance. 
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5.1.2 HSE culture is a complex concept (Paper I) 
Few informants used “HSE culture” in a holistic manner in the interviews. In a 
holistic, systemic model, attention is turned towards the interplay between the various 
aspects of a system. This means that the HSE culture approach in the company may be 
observed through the physical arrangements, the leadership of the company, the local 
managers commitment to HSE, the procedures (known and understandable), 
organisational system and through the workers competence and behaviour. The task is 
to understand how one phenomenon reflects other phenomena.  
The interviews in Paper I show that the factors that was important for HSE culture 
seem to be factors also found in the safety climate literature (Guldenmund 2000; Flin 
et al., 2000). Management, behaviour, competence, procedures, collaboration and 
physical working environment seem to be important.  
Although the interviewed persons in paper I used the concept “HSE culture” in several 
ways, managers and employees recognised for the most part the same themes as being 
the important ones for HSE, and they differed little in their uses of the concept of HSE 
culture and their opinions concerning the HSE challenges. This reflects the fact that 
there was a common opinion about HSE culture in the company. This might be in 
accordance with the integration perspective (Schein, 1985) where culture is perceived 
as the shared understandings in a given organisation.
However, since there are several ways of understanding the concept “HSE culture”, 
the differentiation perspective (Martin, 1992) fits with our findings in Paper II, Paper 
III and Paper IV. Here a significant difference was found between offshore and 
onshore workers regarding opinions about the self-reported working conditions. In 
Paper IV differences were found between the companies and the installations. The 
differentiation perspective emphasises the lack of consensus between interpretations 
and meanings in an organisation and the focus is usually on sub-cultures. There are at 
least some broadly shared rules, which are necessary if the concept of culture is going 
to have any meaning at all (Alvesson, 2002).  
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5.1.3 Management is important (Paper I, II, III, IV) 
Management was frequently mentioned as important for an organisation’s HSE culture 
in the interview study (Paper I). The employees wanted visible managers who 
understood and complied with HSE challenges and, through their decisions and 
actions, could function as role models. This is in line with Flin et al. (2000) who found 
the factor “management” to be the most important one in safety climate studies.
When we analysed subjective working environment and workplace incidents and 
sickness absence in Paper II, we found that the number of recordable injuries was 
significantly correlated with confidence in management. Sickness absence was also 
strongly related to management factors. This seemed to verify the study of Mearns et 
al. (2003) who found that management commitment to health and safety emerges as a 
key predictor of accident incidence. Proficient safety management practice was 
furthermore associated with fewer official accident reports.
In Paper IV we found that the factors “System comprehension” and “Safety versus 
production” displayed the greatest variations for all employees on the 41 installations 
operated by the five operator companies on the Norwegian Shelf. These dimensions 
contained items about management systems and management practice within 
maintenance, reporting and work processes. When analysing self-reported working 
environment offshore and onshore (Paper II and Paper III), it appeared that 
management factors like presence, visibility and involvement in the work were 
important for workers’ job satisfaction. Reason (1997) asserts that the management’s 
commitment to safety is a fundamental component of an organisation’s safety culture.
Guldenmund (2007) argued that it is important to study HSE culture by assessing HSE 
climate on different management levels. In this thesis we used HSE culture interviews 
(Paper I) and HSE climate items (Paper II–IV) on organisational, group and individual 
levels. In Paper II we found upper management, the factor “confidence in 
management”, to be significantly negatively associated with recordable injuries. We 
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did not find this for the factor “nearest management”. This might be in contrast to 
Paper IV where we found that for all the studied dimensions of the health and safety 
climate, the installation factor (local working environment, group level) explained a 
greater percentage of the variance than did company belonging (organisational level). 
The findings in this study may be explained by the fact that the management levels are 
difficult to separate in such surveys. People respond to the safety climate survey based 
on their own experience regarding health and safety, expressed through their own and 
their colleagues’ behaviour, local health and safety systems and prioritisation from the 
installation management. Company policy may be viewed as distant from the 
installation/workplace and hence not be especially influential on their attitudes. The 
relation between high scores on climate surveys and few numbers of injuries may not 
be present using all types of survey scales. On the other hand, supervisors explain, 
justify and apply higher management’s policies to the workforce and are thus 
responsible for the notions that are prevalent among the workers (Guldenmund, 2007). 
However, Zohar and Luria (2005) assumes that supervisory discretion within a 
company may stem from several sources such as interpretation of procedures, tasks not 
covered by the procedures and possible conflicts between performance quantity versus 
quality (e.g. production speed vs. safety precautions). Leader–member exchanges 
involve interpersonal dynamics that are only partially governed by formal procedures, 
and individual beliefs and attributions influence supervisory interpretation and the 
implementation of formal procedures.  
5.1.4. Differences between offshore and onshore employees opinions of 
working conditions (Paper II and III) 
We found differences between offshore and onshore employees regarding their 
perceptions of the working environment in a Norwegian oil and gas company. The 
offshore and onshore departments differed in particular on items related to perceptions 
of the nearest manager and on items about finding electronic information. Offshore 
workers were generally less satisfied with all organisational and working environment 
factors.
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A study from UK shows that the offshore installation managers report difficulties in 
motivating and controlling crucial safety aspects of workforce behaviour even though 
they are aware of the importance of such leadership (O’Dea and Flin, 2001). This may 
reflect problems particular to offshore work, as indicated by the present study. It 
might be that offshore management is more demanding when it comes to the special 
shift patterns. Perceptions of the nearest manager differed significantly between the 
offshore and onshore employees in our sample from 2003, 2004 and 2005. This may 
be explained by the differences in shifts systems and having more than one manager 
to report to offshore.
At the offshore installations nearest manager and employees are living together 24 
hours a day. This provides a greater opportunity for communication during meals and 
coffee breaks and should make communication and confidence building easier. 
However, our surveys did not have items concerning the work–family interface. The 
absence from family and friends for periods of two weeks at a time may be a source of 
stress and dissatisfaction (Parkes, 1998).  Possible conflicts associated with partner 
absence or other psychosocial stressors regarding working on remote locations may be 
explanations for more dissatisfaction with work among offshore than among onshore 
employees. Also, such factors as 24 hours noise and living close to other people could 
be important for understanding the differences between the offshore and the onshore 
workers.
Sickness absence differed significantly between the onshore and offshore departments 
in 2003 and 2004, offshore workers having a higher percentage of sickness absence 
than onshore workers, as shown in Paper II. Offshore employees must pass a medical 
examination every second year to ensure that they are physically and mentally fit for 
the demands of the offshore environment. Offshore workers, based on the selection 
criteria, have better health than the general onshore population. However, it may be 
easier to go to work with sickness when the employees have the possibility to go home 
if the illness develop during the day (as for onshore workers), than when you need to 
travel by helicopter. The offshore employee must be healthy and feel well when 
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entering a new 14 days 12 hour shift period and this may cause a different pattern of 
sick leave.
5.1.5 HSE in petroleum companies 
Although it was not an aim of the study to evaluate the focus on HSE in the petroleum 
industry, the findings of our study warrant some comments. However, we have not 
been able to compare these results with other industries, and the findings must be 
interpreted with caution. 
We found a uniform and relatively high reporting on the ”Safety management and 
involvement” dimension by analysing the five companies discussed in Paper IV. This 
may also be seen as an expression of the high focus on HSE in the offshore Petroleum 
industry in Norway. The results of our study indicate that many of the employees are 
aware of the focus on the HSE-issues from the top management and the authorities, 
and have adopted it as a part of their own attitudes and behaviour. On the other hand, 
this finding must be interpreted with caution, due to a relative low response rate in this 
study.
However, the other papers in this thesis confirm that there is a major focus on HSE in 
the petroleum industry in Norway. In Paper III the item “In my entity, the zero mindset 
(zero accidents, injuries or losses) forms the basis for planning and implementing our 
work” did not differ between onshore and offshore employees in the company. The 
mean scores were high, reflecting the HSE focus in the company. The high values of 
mean satisfaction on organisational and working environment factors in all 
departments support these findings. A weakness of these findings might be that the 
surveys were performed by the company itself. Although anonymity was assured, this 
may have caused better results than the real ones. However, also the opposite could be 
the case, as anonymous complaints may be exaggerated. 
According to Reason (1997), a reporting organisation is important for good health and 
safety performance. A reporting culture is based on trust, and the purpose is to learn 
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from experience in order to avoid unfortunate incidents. The existence of a reporting 
culture can be discerned from the high response rate on the studied company’s survey 
about working conditions in Paper I-III. 
The workers employed in the five operating companies in Paper IV differed in the 
safety climate dimensions “Safety prioritisation”,  “Safety vrs production”, “Individual 
motivation” and “System comprehension” which may be explained by different safety 
cultures in the five companies. Reason (1997) emphasise the learning organisation as 
important for health and safety performance. The companies might learn from each 
other how to improve HSE performance and to build a strong and sound HSE culture.
Lack of competence on risks of diseases may be one explanation for why the attention 
to health and working environment culture at the workplaces is less in focus than 
safety culture and accidents. If managers believe that only health professionals like 
physicians, nurses, ergonomists and occupational hygienists should deal with health 
and working environment risks, the attention in the company will be low. Managers 
are responsible for a healthy working environment and the managers’ competence 
within occupational health risks is a prerequisite for sufficient focus on prevention of 
diseases and sickness absence and promotion of workers’ health. The sickness absence 
in the company in paper I-III is low compared to other industries in Norway. However, 
the high incident of reported work related diseases, especially for musculoskeletal 
diseases, hearing loss and skin disorders, is a clear signal to the management teams 
that more must be done to secure healthy workplaces.
5.1.6 The HSE culture concept 
Although we have, through our research, indicated what seems to be important, we 
still think it is difficult to define the “HSE culture” concept. Based on the definitions 
of “safety culture” used in the nuclear industry (ACSNI, 1993) and Richter and Koch’s 
(2004) definition, the following definition of “HSE culture” encompassing working 
environment, health and environment is suggested:  
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“HSE culture is the shared and learned meanings, experiences and 
interpretations of an organisation’s working environment and how this 
influences people’s decisions and actions against risks for diseases and 
accidents, and promote the health, environment and safety awareness”. 
In this definition the working environment is in focus, understood as technical design 
and equipment, the organisational structure and systems (e.g. competence, 
regulations/procedures) and how these influence the individual’s awareness, decisions 
and actions within these frameworks systems. The employer/manager is responsible 
for the planning, managing and control of the working environment (Ministry of 
labour and social inclusion, 1997). 
The Petroleum Safety Authorities regulation concerning HSE culture from 2002 will 
be revised for activities offshore and for land facilities in 2009. In the regulations 
submitted for consultation the Authority underlines, in the guideline, that culture is not 
an individual characteristic but developed through interaction between people and 
framework conditions. Managers’ responsibility and behaviour is described as 
important factors. This is in line with our findings. Managers on different levels are 
the front figures and responsible for the HSE work in the companies.   
The interaction between the managers and the workers is the main part of the HSE 
culture umbrella, as the fabric. The factors behaviour, competence, collaboration, 
procedures and physical conditions are the spokes. We believe that a figure like the 
HSE culture umbrella is a good way to communicate important factors that can be 
used to improve HSE. As petroleum production is an internationally industry a globe 
has been put behind the HSE culture umbrella to signify the national and local culture 
which has an impact on the HSE culture at the workplaces (Figure 9).
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Figure 9 Health, safety and environment culture umbrella with the globe as a framework for communication. 
We think it is wise to use an illustration like the umbrella to communicate HSE culture 




5.2.1 The qualitative study (Paper I) 
In order to get insight into the HSE culture in the organisation we needed to use 
different research approaches. Our first study was qualitative, to gain insight to the 
subjective experiences and understandings of HSE culture in the company and 
industry by not using a framework developed by researchers. Qualitative research 
explores the richness, depth, and complexity of phenomena. A further methodological 
triangulation, e.g. fieldwork and participant observation, could have mapped “tacit 
knowledge”, basic assumptions and “webs of significance” and would probably have 
improved the study. 
Four researchers collected and analysed the interviews. The different academic 
backgrounds made the analyses richer as the researchers brought different perspectives 
to the interpretation of the data. However, it might be that the information collection 
and analyses could have been better if one or two researchers had carried out the 
whole study. We should have obtained more information about the informants, 
especially on different management level, in order to perform more analyses of 
possible differences between employees and managers on different levels in the 
organisation. However, this might have made it more difficult to protect the 
individuals participating in the interviews. The way the study was performed the 
informants interviewed can not be recognised. 
5.2.2 The quantitative studies (Paper II, III, IV)
Establishing causal links between safety culture or climate measures and safety 
performance in different industries is difficult. In Paper II we found a relationship 
between self-reported working environment concerning management functions and 
injuries. This relationship may be interpreted as causal, due to the longitudinal design. 
However, there might be confounding factors present that were not known to the 
researchers. There were few recordable injuries every year. We used the sum of 
recordable injuries from 2000 until 2004 and this might have influenced the results. 
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A longer observation period might have improved the study. On this basis, parts of the 
surveys of self-reported working environment and organisation surveys might 
probably be used as indicators of risk of injuries. However, more studies are needed to 
confirm this. 
Paper IV had a cross-sectional design, making causality difficult to evaluate. A 
longitudinal design of a similar study would be of great interest.
We used self-reported working environment surveys to get insight into some elements 
of the organisations’ HSE cultures. The questionnaires used in these studies had items 
that were found to be relevant for safety culture. These factors seem to be important 
factors in understanding HSE culture and to measuring HSE climate. Other methods 
could have been used as well, but we decided to concentrate the studies around the 
findings from the interview study. 
The self-reported working environment questionnaire used in Paper II and III was not 
standardized and it was administered by the company itself. However, the 
questionnaire had been used and tested since 1986. One factor lending support to the 
reliability of the data was that the results were stable over three years. The instrument 
was a general instrument for measuring organisational climate and not constructed to 
be correlated with health and safety results as we did in Paper II. If more or other 
items had been included, such as more than one item concerning procedures and other 
items within HSE behaviour and collaboration, different results might have been 
obtained.
The instrument used in Paper IV was validated in a former study, and five of the six 
dimensions were stable through 2001, 2003 and 2005, whereas the sixth dimension, 
”Competence”, was integrated in the 2005 solution and showed a good fit with the 
total model. In Paper IV the adjusted R2 was low, indicating that there are other 
variables that explain the results as well, in addition to the company belonging or the 
installation. This might for instance be accident involvement, job experience and 
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individual factors. This study was important as it included data from the main part of 
the petroleum industry in Norway, five operating companies and a large number of 
contractor companies, and not only data from one company. Although the response 
rate in the study was relatively low, the responses for the different categories of 
personnel corresponded closely to the distribution found in the industry (Petroleum 
Safety Authority Norway, 2006). A weakness was that the company belonging and the 
installations were closely correlated and therefore difficult to separate. The results 
must be interpreted with some caution due to the close relation between these two 
factors.
The results in Paper II and Paper III would have been more precise if individual data 
instead of aggregated data had been used for all analyses. However, in these papers 
we used data from more than one year, which ensured that the results were not 
occasional.
The strength of the study in Paper II was done due to the fact that the datasets came 
from different data sources and were independent. Complete datasets of both the 
survey of self-reported working conditions and the company’s file of safety and 
sickness absence data were used. Because data sources differed, we had to aggregate 
the data from the survey of self-reported working environment to correlate it with 
health and safety data. The analyses were performed at the lowest possible 
organisational level, using departments whenever possible. The data material was, 
however, extensive and the surveys had very high response rates.  
5.2.3 Ethics and loyalty  
Can a person employed in a company perform a study of the HSE culture in this 
company? Some persons might say it is not possible. However, maybe it is not 
possible to do such a study with only researchers from outside of a company either? 
This question has been given considerable thoughts during the study. To be employed 
in one of the companies studied has opened many doors which might have been 
closed for other researchers. To get access to the data bases in the company and 
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understand what possibilities they had, could not easily be done by an external 
researcher. To be allowed to interview persons in the company could have been 
difficult as well for an outsider.
On the other hand, as previously described, the studies have been planned with a clear 
knowledge about the possible interactions between data, loyalty, background and 
position (Malterud, 2001). Studies involving evaluation of the companies have been 
avoided, and the researchers have worked together in teams, to reduce the possibility 
of influence on the results. With researchers both from the company and outside, the 
results have probably become more balanced than with only one partner participating 
in the process. The candidate has at no point been allowed to publish any results 
without the research group’s approval.
A weak part in the study was the interviews of persons. However, assuring their 
anonymity was important during this work, clearly underlining that the information 
would not be given to anyone outside the research group was probably very important. 
On the other hand, we can not know to what extent this made employees’ answers out 
of pure loyalty to the company and not by their heart. Another weak part is the 
questionnaire results, as there always are persons who do not respond if they fear that 
their answers might be seen by authorities. The extent of this problem is not known. 
However, the anonymity, with no questionnaires with names or numbers on and given 
assurances of confidentiality, was a good method for this situation.
5.2.4 Generalization of the results 
The factors, found by the interviews, seemed to reflect important factors to the HSE 
work and culture in the company. Our results in the Papers I, II and III were obtained 
from one company only, and generalisations of the results should be made with great 
caution. However, findings from paper IV included data from 5 companies. Hence, we 
think it might be possible to generalise from these studies to the Norwegian offshore 
industry as a whole, and also have an impact on other types of industry with multiple 
locations. The five companies are all international oil and gas companies, operating 
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both in Norway and internationally. This may support the possibility that the findings 
can be generalized to companies in other countries as well. Similar studies ought to be 
performed in other countries to see if the same findings can be obtained. The results 
may be influenced by other national cultures, other frameworks set by the authorities 
and different working environments and living conditions.
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has shown that “HSE culture” is a concept with several meanings. 
Management, behaviour, competence, procedures, collaboration and physical 
conditions are factors of importance. The main focus in the company studied in papers 
I, II and III was safety, less on health, working environment and the environment.
This study has further shown that management is very important for the employees’ 
understanding of HSE culture and also between self-reported working environment 
concerning management functions and injuries. Management style and trust in the 
manager are important factors when it comes to personal injuries. The company’s 
working and organisational survey might be used as an indicator of risk of injuries.
Onshore workers were more satisfied with all organisational and working environment 
factors. Differences in management style and resources, type of shift work and living 
conditions might be important in explaining the differences and should be studied 
further.
Local HSE work on the installations and the HSE work by the company are important 
to the HSE culture among the workers. Although a good policy for HSE must be set 
up by the top managers to initiate the good HSE work, this is not enough to produce 
good health and safety results on the local workplaces; it must be followed up locally. 
This is of major importance to the workers, the companies themselves, as well as for 
petroleum authorities. 
6.1 Suggestions for further research 
The interpretation of the concept “HSE culture” is important, insofar as it affects how 
the workers, both with and without leadership responsibility, deal with occupational 
health, safety and work environment issues. Different aspects of the HSE culture 
should be investigated in more detail. Further studies on different levels of 
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management and health and injuries should be performed. Understanding the interplay 
between occupational health, safety and environmental issues and how they are 
prioritised in relation to each other and in relation to other organisational goals, e.g. 
productivity and finance, could be part of an important development of our 
understanding of how socially-responsible organisations define and articulate their 
values and conduct their business. 
There might be important factors not included in this study, which for instance may 
explain the difference between installations and companies in Paper IV. We suggest 
further research on factors such as health promotion activities, accident involvement 
and job experience.
Surveys of self-reported working environment and organisation can probably be used 
as indicators of risk of injuries. Further studies are needed to clarify whether these 
relationships are valid in other settings. 
 The differences in perceived working environment and the differences in health and 
safety results onshore and offshore must be further studied to enable us to understand 
and initiate the right actions needed to increase the offshore workers’ satisfaction with 
the working environment.  
A follow-up study with interviews in the petroleum company may be important in 
order to find out if the HSE culture has developed the past years. More longitudinal 
studies as in Paper II would give the industry more knowledge about organizational, 
individual and technical factors that effect HSE in this industry.  
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Page  47 Last sentence. “…. and it displayed the smallest variations on the dimensions 
“HSE behaviour” and “Competence” should be “…. and it displayed the 
smallest variations on the dimensions “Individual motivation” and 
“Competence”
Paper 1  Page 8, last section. “Data in this study is from 2002”, should be “Data in this 
study is from 2003”. 
Paper 2 Reference 21. ”Høivik D, Opheim M, Bovim R, Bye R. HMS-kultur i Statoil. 
Hva vi i Statoil vil legge i HMS-kultur begrepet. In Norwegian. [HSE culture in 
Statoil. What we understand about the concept of HSE culture in Statoil]. 
Trondheim: NTNU; 2003” should be: “Høivik D, Bye R. Health Safety and 
Environment Culture in International Exploration and Production (INT), 
Statoil. NTNU; 2004.” 
Paper 2  Table 2. Response rate (%) should in 2003 be Offshore 71%,  Onshore 74%.  
In 2004 Offshore 76% and Onshore 81%.   
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